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Abstract
This paper aims to provide evidence on a fundamental assump-
tion of contract theory: that agents respond to financial incentives. It
uses data from before the introduction of standard fees for some legal
aid lawyers in England and Wales in 1993. For some inputs, these
substituted a fixed price contract for retrospective fee-for-service re-
muneration, while retaining fee-for-service for travel and waiting time
supplied by lawyers. We look at the effects of these new contracts on
case-level inputs and also examine the extent of substitution across
inputs in response to the two means of payment on offer. Our re-
sults suggest that lawyers responded in ways that are consistent with
theory: (i) high-powered incentives for cost-reduction lowered inputs
that may have been difficult to monitor, and (ii) substitution across
inputs took place in line with a simple view of multitask agency. Our
results have implications for economic theory as well as for legal aid
expenditure control, and current policies on personal injury litigation.
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1 Introduction
A fundamental assumption of contract theory is that agents respond to fi-
nancial incentives provided in the contracts offered by their principals. Two
commonly observed forms of contract are retrospective payments for inputs
supplied (often known as ‘piece rates’) and payments on the basis of prospec-
tively set fees. Laffont and Tirole (1993) examine the ‘high-powered’ in-
centives associated with moving to prospective payment: by making agents
residual claimants to any surplus on the contract, these can prevent artificial
inflation of (unobservable) inputs. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) provide
additional insights by noting that many jobs involve multiple tasks (see also
Baker, 1992). Such “multitasking” can lead workers to substitute between
inputs depending on whether these can be verified and how they are remu-
nerated.
In this paper, we seek to test for these effects, by examining the response
of lawyers in England andWales to changes in the way they have been paid for
some legally aided criminal cases. Because these changes spanned a period
which saw retrospective fee-for-service payment replaced by prospectively
fixed fees, our data provide a natural experiment for considering the effects of
this change. Moreover, because not all inputs were covered by the contractual
change observed in this period, we have a unique opportunity to explore the
way in which input mix may respond to financial incentives. Thus, our results
are of interest from both theoretical and policy perspectives.
The natural experiment in question took place in 1993, as a response
to the substantial year-on-year increases in government expenditure on legal
aid which had occurred over the previous ten years (Gray, 1994). A driv-
ing economic idea behind the legal reforms proposed in this period was that
legal aid generated a set of principal-agent relationships akin to those in
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health care markets (with third party payers potentially unable to monitor
input choices). As such, it was suggested that evidence about the effects of
financial incentives, particularly with respect to whether suppliers could arti-
ficially induce demand, could usefully be imported from such experiences (see
Bevan 1996, 1998). In particular, attention was drawn to the introduction of
Prospective Payment Systems (PPS) in the US, where fixing fees in advance
was intended to remove incentives for over-supply, and the effects of such
contracts on expenditure and drug choice have been extensively examined
(see below).
We study the introduction of prospectively fixed fees in criminal cases in
Magistrates’ Courts in 1993. In cases where lawyers had previously presented
the Legal Aid Board (the legal aid ‘regulator’ until 20001) with an itemised
bill for payment based on piece rates at the end of the case, a system of
standard fees was introduced, which provided them with a prospectively fixed
payment for a large part of their work on the case (while retaining piece
rates for a selection of inputs). The move to standard fees clearly implies a
shift from retrospective fee-for-service payment to high-powered prospective
payment. The changes also emphasise the multitask nature of the services
provided by lawyers in legal cases. Thus, for example, on any given case,
lawyers must supply preparation time, travel and waiting time, and perhaps
perform advocacy. The fact that different tasks are remunerated in different
ways under the standard fees we examine is, potentially, consistent with
multitask theory.
Bearing these points in mind, if lawyers respond to financial incentives
the shift to standard fees can be predicted to have had implications for the
1The Legal Aid Board was replaced by the Legal Services Commission in 2000. Because
our data pre-date this change we refer to the Legal Aid Board in what follows
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number and types of inputs they supplied on similar cases. Whilst earlier
work (Gray, Fenn and Rickman, 1996a) describes and simulates some of
these effects, empirical tests have been lacking to date.2 In this paper we
redress this position, using data on the legal aid bills submitted by lawyers
in Magistrates’ Court criminal cases over the period 1988-1994. Because our
data consists of information on both standard and non-standard fee bills,
including the range of inputs to which they apply, we are able to examine
retrospective fee-for-service versus fixed price contracts, and the extent of
multitask flexibility.3
Of course, such work has important policy implications as well as bear-
ing on the contractual issues raised above. Within legal aid, the control of
expenditure remains a central policy issue (see Cape and Moorhead, 2005).
Further, prospectively fixed fees have been proposed, and implemented, in a
number of areas of the legal system since standard fees were introduced for
criminal legal aid. Most recently, such fees have been introduced for the vast
majority of road traffic claims in England and Wales (DCA, 2003) and sim-
ilar schemes are under discussion for employers’ liability and public liability
claims; thus, a significant fraction of tort claims could soon be run under
prospectively set fees in England and Wales.4 Clearly, the lawyers’ responses
to standard fees may have implications for the services that will be supplied
2Some evidence exists to suggest that solicitors responded to the changed financial
incentives they faced under standard fees; however, this does not relate directly to the
inputs they supplied. In particular, it has been argued that standard fees led solicitors
to “redefine” a case so that more than one fee could be charged for work that previously
appeared on the same bill: a phenomenon known as case-splitting. The Legal Aid Board
(1994) alludes to such behaviour and subsequent research from the Legal Aid Area Office
in Newcastle (1994-95) is also consistent with this.
3Because our data do not contain information on different types of simultaneously
available contract, we do not address the optimality of the contract on offer. See, for
example, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Slade (1996).
4Other examples of fixed fee proposals include those in Woolf (1996) and the system
of standard fees introduced for Scottish criminal claims in 1999.
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under these current reforms.
A variety of studies seek to test the effects of contracts in different organ-
isational setings and it is important to relate our work to these. As Pren-
dergast (1999) notes, Lazear (1996) and Paarsch and Shearer (1996) provide
relatively rare analyses of the empirical effects of piece rate contracts in stan-
dard employment contracts. By contrast, professional services have provided
more opportunities for empirical research. This is particularly true of health
care, where US Medicare has provided fertile territory for such research—see
the excellent survey in Bickerdyke et al. (2002).5 An early study by Rice
(1983) uses changes in reimbursement rates to look for evidence of demand
inducement, as do later studies by Krasnik et al. (1990) and Yip (1998).
By and large, changes in fees have not been the basis for work on demand
inducement, however (see Folland, Goodman and Stano, 2001, p. 171). In-
stead, research has largely focused on the (essentially fixed price) Prospective
Payment Systems (PPS) introduced in 1983, in response to worries about
the incentives for physicians to inflate demand under third party funded
retrospective fee-for-service schemes—a structure that resembled legal aid
at that time. The prospective payments were based on Diagnostic-Related
Groups (DRGs), which categorise each patient care episode by expected level
of resource use and cost, and covered hospital charges, but physicians were
still reimbursed on a per-item basis. Contributions by Phelps (1986), Pauly
(1994a, b) and Labelle et al. (1994 a, b) and others have developed (and
examined empirically) a conceptual framework for supplier-induced demand
in US health care. Much subsequent work (for example, Gay and Kronen-
feld, 1990; McClennan, 1997; Dismuke and Sena, 1999, for Portugal; Gilman,
5We have already noted that the well-documented parallels between principal-agent
problems in legal services and health care (see Arrow, 1963) and the impact of evidence
from health care on legal aid policy in the England and Wales.
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2000; Kroneman and Nagy, 2001, for Hungary) has looked at the subsequent
effects of PPS by DRG, but typically not at the level of individual physician
income. Finally, Gray, Rickman and Fenn (1999) provide an interesting par-
allel with health care work by looking at whether payment schemes generate
supplier-induced demand by law firms.
Our paper differs from the above work in several key respects. First,
unlike PPS by DRG, standard fees affect lawyers’ fees directly so the links
to behaviour are clearer.6 Second, our data are particularly unusual in con-
taining changes in fees over time and within case. As such, they allow us
to examine the effects of prospective payment and the extent of multitask-
style substitution between inputs, something which remains relatively un-
explored.7 Finally, our data are unusual in providing a UK perspective on
these issues and, as we have noted, they relate to important debates within
UK legal systems at present.8
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the fee-
for-service and standard fee arrangements operating in criminal Magistrates’
Courts before and after 1993. Section 3 then describes the predictions we are
able to test arising from the switch between these arrangements in 1993. In
Sections 4 and 5 we present our data and results, before Section 6 concludes
the paper.
6Similarly, as our data relate specifically to inputs, as opposed to the outcomes of
behaviour, this also provides a close link to contract theory.
7Olson (1996) and Slade (1996), both provide empirical results on multitasking.
Schramm and Gabel, 1988, describe PPS-related shifts cross different kinds of work
(not within a job) induced by DRGs, while Krasnik et al. (1990) provide limited ev-
idence on substitution for retrospective fee-for-service graduated across different health
care interventions.
8Indeed, having noted links from health policy research to legal aid policy, it is inter-
esting that current English health policy is also moving towards fixed price reimbursement
for hospitals and other providers, based on a standard national tariff applied to services
delivered. Thus, our work may have still wider policy relevance.
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2 Standard fees in Magistrates’ Courts
The Legal Aid in Criminal and Care Proceedings (Costs) Regulations 1989
provided for a system of standard fees in the Magistrates’ Courts a year after
they had been introduced in the Crown Court. However, strong dissent from
lawyers (both solicitors and barristers) delayed their becoming operational
for a further four years (see Zander, 1993). Tables 1 and 2 present the
information necessary for explaining the operation of standard fees at the
time they were introduced. The Tables relate to the fees paid in 1993/4 for
non-franchised legal aid work outside London.9
***Tables 1 and 2 here****
As can be seen from Table 1, standard fees apply in three categories of
cases. Broadly speaking, these are guilty pleas and other uncontested mat-
ters (Category 1), contested trials (Category 2) and committal proceedings
(Category 3). Given the case’s category, its core cost can be calculated. This
was done in 1993/4 by applying the rates in Table 2 to the amounts of inputs
reported by the solicitor as having been provided on the case.
The inputs forming the core cost are preparation, routine letters and tele-
phone calls, advocacy and attendance on client(s) and counsel at court.10 If
the core cost fell below the lower limit in Table 1, the solicitor received the
lower standard fee to cover this work (e.g. £140 in Category 1 cases). If
the core cost lay between the lower and higher limits in Table 1, the higher
standard fee was paid by the Legal Aid Board. Finally, if the solicitor could
9Our discussion of the operation of standard fees ignores a number of complicating
factors which are not important to what follows. The interested reader is directed to
Edwards (1993).
10Note that “attendance” relates to timetabled court time as opposed to untimetabled
waiting time (the latter features in non-core costs, below). This is important for Section
5, where attendance is treated (correctly) as exogenous to the solicitor.
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demonstrate core cost in excess of the higher limit, the work done was remu-
nerated at the itemised rates in Table 2. Hence the fee was graduated, with
the allowable level depending on the solicitor’s report, audited by the Legal
Aid Board, of the work supplied to the case. This basis for remunerating
criminal legal aid cases remains essentially the same to date, with the rates
and limits uprated periodically by the successor to the Legal Aid Board, the
Legal Services Commission.
It will be clear from this description that the components of the core
cost do not cover all of the solicitor’s work. In particular, travel and waiting
and out-of-pocket disbursements are each reimbursed at itemised rates (in
the case of the former, the 1993/4 rate is in Table 2), as was true of all
inputs prior to 1993. Further, the solicitor may be able to claim percentage
enhancements to the itemised rates, based on demonstrating the exceptional
competence and dispatch with which the work was done or the exceptional
circumstances of the case. If either is deemed proven, standard fees do not
apply.
3 Standard fees and economic theory
A solicitor’s input decision on a given case can be thought of as labour sup-
ply decision, with the movement towards standard fees altering the budget
constraint the solicitor faces (Gray, Fenn and Rickman, 1996a).11 Start with
fee-for-service remuneration. Assume that solicitors derive utility from con-
11We focus on inputs but, in principle, it is possible that solicitors could respond to
standard fees by changing case volumes—independent of any possible “case-splitting”, as
discussed in the Introduction. Our data do not permit analysis of this because we do
not have information on overall case volumes, or firm identifiers that could help establish
whether ‘larger’/‘smaller’ firms took up cases under standard fees. We consider the effects
of this on our results in Footnote 24.
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sumption (C ) and leisure (L), U(C,L), Ui > 0, Uii < 0, i = C,L. Further,
assume for simplicity that the solicitor works on only one, legally aided, case
where each input is remunerated at a constant rate w. Then, with a time
constraint of T and defining H ≡ T − L, the solicitor’s problem is
max
H
U(C,L) s.t.
 C = wHT ≥ H + L
The familiar solution (UL/UC = w) is depicted at point X in Figure 2: the
solicitor is on the budget constraint TE, deriving utility U0.
*****Figure 1 here*****
Now consider a simplified version of the standard fee (in particular, as-
sume only one standard fee level and ignore non-core costs, for the mo-
ment).12 As we have seen, there is an input level, say H0, above which the
solicitor is remunerated at the fee-for-service rate, w. Below this, however, he
receives a fixed fee, F, regardless of his inputs. This places two “kinks” in the
solicitor’s budget constraint, which is now TYGZE. The problem becomes
max
H
U(C,L) s.t.

C = F if H ≤ H0
C = wH if H ≥ H0
T ≥ H + L
There are now two potential outcomes. It is possible that the solicitor will
choose to minimise his inputs (point Y in Figure 1) or raise them in order to
qualify for higher fee-for-service remuneration (point Z ). We refer to these re-
spectively as a fixed price effect and a threshold effect. Which is the outcome
12The analysis is easily generalised to more than one standard fee level.
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will depend on the levels of F, w and H0, the solicitor’s preferences for con-
sumption and leisure and the case’s requirements (since it is easier to raise,
undetected, the input level on cases which already require high input).13
Core costs form only a part of the standard fee regime: we have seen that
travel and waiting time continue to be remunerated on a fee-for-service basis.
The above theory is easily adapted to accommodate this possibility. As a
result, we would predict that, in cases where core inputs fall, lawyers may
seek to maintain income by increasing their supply of non-core inputs. This
we refer to as a switching effect.14
To summarise our discussion, other things equal, we would expect to see
reductions in the reported supply of those inputs covered by the standard
fee, although it is possible that, at the thresholds, some cases may experience
increases (to push them to a higher fee). These anticipated effects may
not, however, be observed in non-core inputs; indeed, we might expect to
observe substitution towards these inputs. We now describe our data before
proceeding to test for the effects above.
4 Data
Following an original survey of legal aid bills from 1988-1990 (Gray and
Fenn, 1991), the Legal Aid Board continued to collect comparable data on
13On introducing standard fees, the Lord Chancellor’s expectation was that the vast
majority of cases (90%) would be captured by the two standard fee bands. Accordingly,
input reductions seem likely, in practice, to outweigh input increases.
14 The extent of this latter effect captures multitask sensitivity to financial incentives.
It is interesting to speculate on whether such differentiated payment is optimal in the
current context. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) show that piece rates are more likely to
be optimal when it is desirable to encourage the inputs in question but they are relatively
unobservable, while others can be partially monitored. Although these conditions hold for
some of our inputs, it is not obvious that the chosen combination of fixed and piece rates
is optimal. For example, why do travel and waiting need more encouragement than, say,
preparation?
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the inputs recorded on subsequent bills up to the end of 1994. Our dataset,
therefore pools these two sources of data to provide 10,932 legal aid bills (with
information on inputs reported in each case) dating from 1988 to 1994.15
Table 3 shows the number of bills in our pooled dataset by year, with a
breakdown of these into bills assessed through the original fee-for-service
system, and those assessed under the new standard fee procedures.16 The
new procedures were introduced in June 1993 and there was subsequently a
gradual transfer of all bills received such that by January 1994 virtually all
bills were assessed under standard fee procedures. Table 3 also reports the
mean solicitors’ costs (and their standard deviation, SD) by type of fee, to
give a clear indication of the scale of work covered by standard fees in terms
of payments.
****Table 3 here*****
A set of summary descriptive statistics for the pooled dataset is contained
in Table 4. Clearly, the range of costs and inputs reported by comparison
with their mean values indicate a highly skewed distribution for all variables.
While the mean amount claimed on bills over the whole sample period is
£378, indicating the presence of a large number of bills for relatively minor
offences with little representation required, there is a long upper tail of claim
values, up to a maximum in the sample of nearly £33,000 for one case. This
pattern is also reflected in the inputs reported in the bills: the mean numbers
of attendances and hearings are just 3 and 4 respectively, but some claims
report far more than this. Similarly, most cases involve little more than two
15Although the notion of core and non-core costs is specific to standard fees, our data
include details on comparable inputs spanning this period.
16Note that bills assessed under the standard fee procedures may not require a standard
fee if the costs exceed the upper limit proscribed for the relevant category of claim.
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hours time input to any of the categories reported, and little more than 6 or
7 letters and phone calls, but a minority of claims report several hundreds.
****Table 4 here*****
5 Analysis
5.1 Case costs
Useful initial information can be gained by comparing the distribution of
core costs for a sample of similar bills before and after the introduction of the
new procedures. To do this we selected a subsample of bills received outside
London in 1993 and 1994 where the case was contested (i.e. a Category 2
claim under standard fee rules). For each bill in this subsample (337 cases
assessed using fee-for-service, 383 assessed under the new standard fee rules)
an estimate was made of what the total core cost figure would have been
if it had been costed in accordance with the rates shown in Table 2. The
distributions of the resulting cost estimates are shown for the two types of
fee assessment in Figure 2.
***Figure 2 here***
The mean of the standard fee distribution is significantly lower than the
fee-for-service distribution (£237 as opposed to £290) and this is clearly
evident in the increased preponderance of lower costs in the former distri-
bution. Moreover, although visual inspection of Figure 2 could help identify
the presence of ‘threshold effects’, as described in Section 3, the evidence
is not conclusive.17 In the remainder of this paper we focus on ‘fixed-price
17It would be necessary to have more detailed information on cases around the standard
fee thresholds in order to be more conclusive about the presence of this effect. Nevertheless,
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effects‘ (and ‘switching effects’) which may be the explanation for the general
downward shift in the core cost distribution seen in Figure 2.
5.2 Behaviour of core and non-core inputs
We next consider graphically the behaviour of individual inputs over our data
period. Figure 3 shows for each year the mean number of dates in attendance
at court for each case, and the number of hearings per case. The Figure shows
how, in 1993/4, reductions in the average number of attendances and hearings
reported on any one bill occurred. This may be evidence to confirm the view
that “case-splitting”–the submission of more than one bill per case—was
occurring as a consequence of the new rules introduced in 1993.
*****Figure 3 here*****
Of course, while the number of attendances and hearings per case fell, it
need not be true that the number of hours worked on behalf of the client has
also fallen, given that more time may have been spent on each attendance and
hearing. Figures 4-6 illustrate the trends in reported time spent on various
activities as declared on legal aid bills: Figures 4 and 5 relate to the items
comprising core costs, while Figure 6 looks at the non-core inputs.
*****Figures 4-6 here*****
For each of the core cost inputs, there appears to be a reduction in the
number of hours or items recorded in 1994. This is most evident in the case
of attendance time, and routine letters and calls. Turning to the non-core
non-parametric tests show that the two distributions in Figure 2 are dissimilar in shape: a
standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions rejected the null
of similarity with p = 0.018; similarly, a Pearson test (see Stoline and Ury, 1979; Anderson,
1996) rejected the same null with a test statistic of 5.36 against a critical value of 3.29.
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inputs (Figure 6), the same pattern is not evident here; indeed, reported
waiting time increased in 1994.
5.3 Regression analysis of the impact of standard fees
on case inputs
We now seek clearer evidence on ‘fixed price’ and ‘switching’ effects con-
sequent upon the introduction of standard fees. The first of these effects
suggests a reduction in ‘core’ inputs per case over and above any reduction
due to case-splitting. The second suggests an increase in non-core inputs
associated with each court attendance or hearing18. These hypotheses imply
testing for a change in the mean number of input hours per case, controlling
for the number of attendances or hearings recorded for that case: i.e. we
use a regression-based approach in which it is also possible to control for
variations in inputs due to case type and location.
The estimating equation for the jth input on the ith case is therefore
Hij = αj + βjCij + γjXij + δjDj + vij (1)
where Hij represents the total number of inputs declared in the i
th bill, Cij
is the number of dates (attendances or hearings) on which the inputs were
provided, Xij is a vector of other factors which affect the complexity of
the case (described below), and Dj represents a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if the bill was assessed under standard fee rules, and zero otherwise19.
18For most inputs, the natural driver to consider is the number of court attendances;
however, for advocacy time, it is more appropriate to use the number of hearings.
19The intervention variable Dj is defined in terms of the assessment procedure used for
each claim. It is not an indicator variable for whether a standard fee was in fact applied
to the bill, as this would clearly be endogenous.
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The parameters to be estimated are αj, βj, γj, δj, and vij is the residual. In
particular, we are looking to test the null hypothesis for each input that δj =
0: that is, that there was no structural break attributable to the introduction
of standard fee assessment procedures.
While it is feasible to estimate consistently the system in (1) as a set of or-
dinary least squares regressions, it seems quite likely that the error terms vij
are correlated across inputs (E(vijvik) = σjk). That is, if a solicitor chooses
to spend relatively more time on preparation for a particular case, it is likely
that she will also choose to spend relatively more time on other core inputs
such as letter writing, and possibly less time on non-core inputs such as travel
and waiting. When estimating the system of equations in (1), it consequently
makes sense to take this information into account in order to improve the
efficiency of the estimates. Therefore we estimate the parameters in (1) using
Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression estimator (SURE)—an asymptoti-
cally efficient generalised least squares algorithm. The inputs for which we
have information are: attendance hours; advocacy hours; preparation hours;
waiting hours; travelling hours; letters written; and telephone calls made.
Thus, we estimate using SURE a system of seven equations in which the
independent variables include a relevant measure of the number of atten-
dances or hearings; the number of defendants in the case; the plea (where
relevant); and dummy variables representing the offence type, the legal aid
region, and the intervention variable indicating whether the bill was assessed
under standard fee rules. The estimation results and diagnostics are reported
in Table 5, and the associated correlation matrix of residuals is shown in Ta-
ble 5a. The latter table is provided to demonstrate that, as expected, the
unexplained variations in inputs are generally positively correlated with each
other—for example, a case in which an unusually high number of letters
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is written is likely also to have an unusually high number of phone calls
(r = 0.4399)20 It is this inter-equation correlation which provides the addi-
tional efficiency for the SURE estimator.
*****Tables 5 and 5a here*****
The estimation results in Table 5 suggest that increasing the number of
defendants has a positive effect on all the inputs (and is statistically signifi-
cant in all cases apart from waiting time).21 Also the presence of a not guilty
plea significantly increases all relevant inputs as might be expected. These
results are intuitive in so far as more defendants and contested prosecutions
increase case complexity. As also expected, the number of dates spent in at-
tendance or at hearings increase each input level significantly. Finally there
are plausible and significant relationships between inputs used and offence
types as well as court locations.22
The coefficient estimates for the standard fee regressor imply that the
impact of the new rules resulted in a significant reduction in the amount of
attendance, preparation and advocacy time spent per attendance, and in the
number of letters and telephone calls per attendance. By contrast, waiting
time per attendance increased significantly and travel time per attendance
remained constant.23 It is therefore apparent that the items covered by the
20The Breusch-Pagan test of independence at the foot of the table is highly significant,
indicating that the null of significant correlation between equations cannot be rejected.
21To illustrate with an example, an extra defendant increases the expected attendance
time by 0.299 × 60 ≈ 18minutes, while it adds 0.443 to the expected number of routine
telephone calls and 1.96 to the expected number of letters.
22Note that the omitted offence category was ‘Other’. The estimated coefficients on
the regional dummy variables are not reported for clarity (there were some significant
differences across regions: in particular the levels of most inputs were higher in London
and the South East than elsewhere).
23Following our discussion in Footnote 14, it is interesting to speculate on whether
the difference between our travel and waiting time results is related to monitoring costs.
Arguably, it may be easier for an assessor to estimate typical travel time than to be aware
of time spent waiting on a case.
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standard fee generally fell, whereas those continuing to be reimbursed on an
itemised basis either rose or remained unchanged.
*****Table 6 here*****
These results broadly confirm the hypothesis that solicitors reacted to the
withdrawal of a fee for service arrangement on some inputs by, on average,
reducing the supply of these inputs, whereas for those inputs which continued
to be reimbursed retrospectively solicitors either did not significantly change
their supply (travel time) or substituted more of the input for others that
had been reduced (waiting time).24
6 Conclusions
The introduction of standard fees for criminal cases in Magistrates’ Courts in
1993 provides a ‘natural experiment’ for examining the effects of prospective
fixed price contracts in comparison with retrospective fee-for-service con-
tracts. This is valuable in the context of contract theory because the oppor-
tunity to test predictions from a body of theory seldom arises given available
data (particularly outside the health care setting). It is valuable in the con-
text of policy when the authorities in England and Wales and Scotland have
placed (and continue to place) notable reliance on prospectively set fees in
order to achieve a variety of objectives; from (legal aid) expenditure control
24 Section 3 noted that firms could also respond to standard fees by changing the volume
of cases they took. In particular, it might be suggested that firms would take more cases
in order to generate efficiencies and gain rents. Such an effect seems unlikely to account
for our results. First, if changes did occur, firms are likely to have taken longer than a
year to adjust their business profiles (this may have required hiring or re-skilling); thus,
our post-1993 data are unlikely to reflect this. Second, and perhaps more importantly, if
the input reductions we observe are due to increased efficiency, it is unclear why they did
not impact on travel and waiting time. Thus, the pattern of responses that we observe
seem more consistent with the behaviour we have described.
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to access to justice. Our results, suggesting that solicitors appear generally
to have responded to standard fees in the way that contract theory would
predict, therefore have wide implications.
We have found that, when presented with remuneration that did not
reward the application of extra inputs (other than at higher thresholds),
solicitors reduced their supply of such inputs in comparison with previous
practice. In contrast, where fee-for-service continued to be in place, solicitors
raised the levels of inputs supplied, apparently substituting these for those
inputs where marginal cost was not covered—in precisely the way suggested
by literature on multitask agency.
Following the introduction of standard fees, the average cost of cases
covered by the scheme fell (following five consecutive-on-year increases). Our
results suggest that the effects, however, may have been wider than this
immediate drop in the unit cost of bills in 1994. For a start, it seems to be
the case that legally aided defendants (and the Legal Aid Board) received a
different “product” following the introduction of standard fees in 1993. It is
not possible to say which of these products was superior: this would depend
on the extent to which inputs and output quality are positively related and
the extent to which some of the work done prior to 1993 added value to the
client’s case. However, even if one simply looks at the expenditure effects
of standard fees, the combination of case-splitting and increased travel and
waiting implies hidden increases in, and incomplete control of, expenditure
which another incentive scheme might have avoided. Of course, it should
also be appreciated that an important objective of standard fees (and legal
aid reform more generally) was to control the potential for supplier-induced
expenditure increases as observed in US health care (see Bevan, Holland and
Partington, 1994); as such, our results may indicate merit in the reforms.
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More generally, our paper complements Gray, Rickman and Fenn (1999) and
suggests that solicitors do respond to financial incentives; something that
economic theory recognises, and current/future reform should acknowledge.
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Table 1: Standard fees 1993/4 (non-London) 
 
Types of 
proceedings 
Lower st'd. fee Lower limit Higher st'd. fee Higher limit 
Category 1 £140 £261 £336 £451 
Category 2 £247 £447 £566 £745 
Category 3 £223 £395 £505 £689 
 
 
Table 2: Itemised rates, 1993/4 (non-London) 
 
Class of work Rate 
Preparation £43.25 per hour
Advocacy £54.50 per hour
Attendance at court £29.50 per hour
Travel and waiting £24.25 per hour
Routine letters/telephone calls £3.35 per item. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Numbers of bills by year and type of fee, 1988-94, and mean (and SD) solicitors’  
costs (£) by type of fee, 1993-94 
 
 
 FFS Std fee (category) Total 
Year  1 2 3  
1988 759    759 
1989 1059    1059 
1990 1270    1270 
1991 2215    2215 
1992 2132    2132 
1993 1440 316 100 83 1939 
1994 72 842 351 293 1558 
Total 8947 1158 451 376 10932 
Mean (SD) solicitors’ costs 1993-94 £536 
(£1172)
£239 
(£135) 
£420 
(£230) 
£423 
(£362) 
£411 
(£731) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics, 1988-1994 
 
 
 N Min. Max. Mean St'd. 
deviation
Total Solicitors Costs (Inc VAT) 10932 4 32884 378 659
No. of Dates in Attendance 10561 0 67 4 3
No. of Dates in Advocacy 10420 0 32 3 2
Time attending (hrs) 10827 0 77 2 2
Time in Advocacy (hrs) 10817 0 69 1 2
Time Preparing (hrs) 10824 0 234 2 4
Travelling time (hrs) 10813 0 100 1 2
Waiting time (hrs) 10814 0 69 1 2
No. of Letters Written 10821 0 120 7 8
No. of Telephone Calls 10819 0 234 6 9
 
 
 Table 5: SURE regression results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Time 
attending 
 
Time in 
advocacy 
Time 
preparing
Letters 
written 
Phone 
calls made 
Travelling 
time 
Time 
waiting 
No of defendants 0.299 0.203 0.238 1.963 0.443 0.150 0.012 
 (8.01)** (5.46)** (2.61)** (13.10)** (2.41)* (3.11)** (0.34) 
Not guilty plea 0.128 0.250 0.309 1.670 0.461   
 (3.80)** (7.05)** (3.56)** (11.13)** (2.67)**   
Dates in attendance 0.470  0.320 1.144 1.095 0.216 0.182 
 (96.23)**  (26.14)** (55.45)** (43.75)** (33.68)** (35.82)** 
Dates in advocacy  0.376      
  (58.78)** 
 
     
Violence -0.075 -0.223 -0.154 1.151 -0.249 -0.152 0.048 
 (1.26) (3.76)** (1.06) (4.85)** (0.86) (2.00)* (0.83) 
Robbery 0.100 -0.150 0.206 -0.288 1.248 0.342 0.534 
 (0.73) (1.09) (0.62) (0.53) (1.86) (1.94) (3.95)** 
Sexual Offences 0.360 -0.414 -0.172 0.786 1.638 0.059 -0.045 
 (2.74)** (3.16)** (0.54) (1.50) (2.54)* (0.35) (0.35) 
Burglary -0.316 -0.453 -0.122 0.537 -0.256 0.004 0.407 
 (4.93)** (7.06)** (0.78) (2.10)* (0.81) (0.04) (6.44)** 
Theft -0.273 -0.364 -0.206 0.728 -0.382 -0.102 0.221 
 (5.09)** (6.79)** (1.57) (3.39)** (1.45) (1.48) (4.18)** 
Fraud 0.280 -0.216 2.495 0.607 0.401 0.353 0.071 
 (2.58)** (1.99)* (9.42)** (1.40) (0.75) (2.53)* (0.66) 
Criminal Damage -0.262 -0.174 -0.210 0.762 -0.355 -0.247 0.030 
 (3.01)** (2.01)* (0.99) (2.19)* (0.83) (2.20)* (0.34) 
Drugs Offences -0.056 -0.284 0.532 0.811 0.618 0.388 0.197 
 (0.57) (2.88)** (2.20)* (2.05)* (1.27) (3.05)** (2.03)* 
Motoring Offences -0.251 -0.204 -0.261 0.975 -0.045 -0.108 0.136 
 (3.89)** 
 
(3.16)** (1.65) (3.77)** (0.14) (1.29) (2.13)* 
Standard Fee -0.484 -0.262 -0.285 -1.355 -1.678 -0.005 0.206 
 (10.41)** 
 
(5.66)** (2.51)* (7.27)** (7.34)** (0.08) (4.50)** 
Constant 0.591 -0.036 1.051 -0.601 4.464 0.845 0.717 
 (7.77)** 
 
(0.47) (5.64)** (1.97)* (11.93)** (8.68)** (9.62)** 
Observations 9480 9480 9480 9480 9480 9480 9480 
R-sq 0.5332 0.2726 0.1173 0.3193 0.2254 0.1542 0.1473 
chi2 10667.98 3897.76 1057.6 4316.53 2535 1473.68 1587.98 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note: Coefficients on regional dummies omitted from table 
Table 5a: Correlation matrix of residuals between SURE equations 
 
 
 
Equation: 
Time 
attending 
Time in 
advocacy
Time 
preparing
No of 
letters 
No of 
phone 
calls 
Travelling 
time 
Waiting 
time 
(1) Time attending 1.0000       
(2) Time in advocacy 0.4387 1.0000      
(3) Time preparing 0.4405 0.3338 1.0000     
(4) No of letters 0.1600 0.0916 0.1306 1.0000    
(5) No of phone calls 0.3607 0.2189 0.2398 0.4399 1.0000   
(6) Travelling time 0.4590 0.3548 0.3512 0.1696 0.3772 1.0000  
(7) Waiting time 0.1152 0.0486 0.0709 0.0919 0.1461 0.2970 1.0000
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(21) = 16598.175, Pr = 0.0000 
 
 
Figure 1:  Standard fees and the solicitor’s budget constraint 
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Figure 2: Distribution of core costs (£) for category 2 type bills, non-London 1993/4 
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Figure 3: Number of attendances and hearings per case, all bills 1988-94 
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Figure 4: Mean hours per case in attendance, advocacy and preparation, all bills 1988-
94 
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Figure 5: Mean numbers of letters and phone calls per case, all bills 1988-94 
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Figure 6: Mean hours per case in travelling and waiting, all bills 1988-94 
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